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years. This article analyses the prospects for a lasting, stable settlement in Northern 
Ireland. Experience has shown that construction, like reform, of constitutions and 
constitutional frameworks in deeply divided societies is no mean task. This article 
draws lessons from Canada's failed Charlottetown Accord (1992) to suggest that 
two fatal flaws - expanding the agenda to include the demands of multiple groups, 
and opening the constitutional process to mass legitimisation through use of 
referenda - can undermine political stability and the prospect of settlement. Canada, 
a country that like Northern Ireland features a long string of failed constitutional 
settlements, provides an excellent illustration of the problems involved. As is the 
case in Northern Ireland, the Canadian constitutional quagmire has grown out of 
the imperative to reconcile the rights of an entrenched ethno-national minority with 
majority rule. In both countries the traditional defining cleavage is ascriptive. In 
both, centuries of resentment, as well as expectations raised and dashed by 
constitutional failure, have led to political instability. In Canada, this has meant 
threats to the integrity of the country itself. In Northern Ireland the consequences 
have been even more serious. 
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Introduction 
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public 
passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional 
questions to the decision of the whole society. James Madison, Federalist 49 
Northern Ireland has celebrated what have been billed as two major 
political achievements - the Good Friday Agreement (10 April 1998)’ and 
its subsequent endorsement in a ‘peace referendum’ (22 May 1998). Both 
have created momentum towards long-term stability and, after many false 
dawns, what is widely acknowledged as a break-through in a seemingly 
intractable problem. Neither achievement can be underestimated, either in 
terms of the detail of the Agreement, or its electoral support expressed in 
both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic (71 per cent and 95 per cent 
in referenda respectively). At issue here, however, is a challenge, drawing on 
the Canadian experience, to the somewhat simplistic assumption that the 
process, thus far, will lead inexorably to political stability. 
The momentous Good Friday Agreement was the culmination of a 
process initiated by the then Secretary of State Peter Brooke in 1989 that 
repeatedly faltered, but eventually led to multiparty talks (initially excluding 
Sinn FCin) in June 1996. Little progress was made as the delegates failed to 
agree on the issue of decommissioning of weapons by paramilitary 
organisations. Movement became possible, however, with the 1997 United 
Kingdom general elections. 
In May 1997 a new Labour government was elected to Westminster with 
a landslide victory ending eighteen years of Conservative rule. The size of 
the Labour mandate (44 per cent vote and 419 seats) nullified the political 
influence exerted by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) over the previous 
administration. Meanwhile, Sinn Fein’s success in the election increased that 
party’s clout, and led to direct negotiations with the British government. 
These negotiations, according to Sinn Fkin, resulted in key demands being 
met over four crucial issues. Sinn FCin would be admitted to multiparty 
talks on the same basis as other parties; those talks would be completed 
within a fixed time frame; the government would not require decommis- 
sioning of weapons before or during negotiations; and confidence-building 
measures, such as a relaxation in security and concessions for ‘political 
prisoners’ (those jailed for terrorist crimes) would be introduced. The result 
was the IRA cease-fire, and Sinn FCin’s admission to the talks. The renewal 
of the cease-fire (20 July 1997) was met with the same degree of surprise as 
its collapse in February 1996. IRA terrorists had ‘held the line’ for seventeen 
months before bombing London’s Docklands, killing two people and 
injuring many others. Sinn FCin, along with parties linked to loyalist 
paramilitaries, became part of the negotiating team which led to the Good 
Friday Agreement. The Agreement provides the blueprint for substantive 
constitutional construction. Yet experience has shown that construction, 
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like reform, of constitutions and constitutional frameworks in deeply 
divided societies is no mean task. This article draws lessons from Canada’s 
failed Charlottetown Accord (1992) to suggest that two fatal flaws - 
expanding the agenda to include the demands of multiple groups, and 
opening the constitutional process to mass legitimisation through use of 
referenda - can undermine political stability and the prospect of settlement. 
Canada, a country that like Northern Ireland features a long string of 
failed constitutional settlements, provides an excellent illustration of the 
problems involved. As is the case in Northern Ireland, the Canadian 
constitutional quagmire has grown out of the imperative to reconcile the 
rights of an entrenched ethno-national minority with majority rule. In both 
countries the traditional defining cleavage is ascriptive. In both, centuries of 
resentment, as well as expectations raised and dashed by constitutional 
failure, have led to political instability. In Canada, this has meant threats to 
the integrity of the country itself. In Northern Ireland the consequences 
have been even more serious. 
This article unfolds in four sections. First, an argument is made about 
the conditions under which political stability in deeply divided societies - 
operationally known as consociational democracy - may be undermined 
through the reform or construction of liberal democratic constitutions that 
are insflciently sensitive to key stabilising factors. The second section 
details Canada’s disastrous and destabilising experiment with constitutional 
democracy. The third section suggests that conditions in Northern Ireland 
are sufficiently analogous to the Canadian case that important lessons can 
be learned - especially given the consequences associated with the failure of 
the peace process. The final section summarises the argument. 
Stability in deeply divided societies 
In contrast to early work in comparative politics on the maintenance of 
political stability (Almond 1956; Almond and Coleman, 1960; Almond and 
Verba 1963), consociational theory suggests that stability is possible in 
deeply divided societies through the skilful use of elite accommodation.2 
While the societal masses (or ‘pillars’) may remain mutually antipathetic, 
governing elite representatives of each pillar cooperate to ensure stable 
government. The theory revolves around a common desire among elites to 
ensure the most equitable and efficient allocation of resources in the making 
of public policy. 
This article is based upon two basic assumptions: that some form of 
consociational democracy is necessary for the stable and peaceful govern- 
ance of liberal democratic societies that are deeply d i~ ided;~  and that 
consociational democracy revolves around four inviolable conditions (C). 
These are, first: 
CI: All bargaining takes place among elites, who are universally considered 
legitimate representatives of their societal constituents. 
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Note that this is a fairly weak condition. It does not suggest that elites are 
universally supported among their constituents, merely that there exists 
some universally accepted selection mechanism and that elites selected are 
legitimate spokespersons for their constituents. 
CZ: There is universal adherence to, and acceptance of, the ‘rules of the game’. 
Lijphart (1977: 25) suggests that there are four main rules: 
Second: 
Elites must eschew the inclination to construct governing coalitions of 
minimum winning size (Riker 1962), and instead seek broadly inclusive 
‘grand coalitions’. 
Each member of the grand coalition must have a veto. 
Resources must be divided proportionally. 
A high degree of autonomy is necessary for each pillar to govern its 
own internal affairs. 
Again, this is not a terribly controversial condition. It suggests that elites 
place a higher premium on political stability than they do on the benefits 
that could be derived from defecting from the consociational arrangement 
to satisfy demands of their societal constituency. In game theoretic terms, 
because elites may be said to be engaged in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
with no endpoint and a high discount parameter (Axelrod 1984), there is no 
incentive for any player to discontinue cooperative behaviour, provided that 
the status quo remains in equilibrium. 
In such circumstances, due to the expectation of retaliation meeting any 
defection, the expected utility for each player is greater for maintaining the 
consociational arrangement than for satisfying societal constituents. Put 
differently, we can suggest a third condition: 
C3: Cooperation will be preferred to defection provided the expected utility of 
cooperation (typically measured in terms of political stability) is greater than the 
societal costs (k) of maintaining cooperation. 
This entirely intuitive point is necessary to emphasise because it is not just a 
passive constraint. By virtue of C,, elites can conspire to keep the value for 
‘k’ low by keeping controversial issues off the public agenda and deal with 
them instead in private negotiations, where the potential for policy 
manoeuvrability and compromise are maximised. 
C4: There is universal recognition of those who constitute the players in the game. 
This condition is similar to C1 except that it introduces the non- 
controversial provision that the societal pillars represented must be 
universally recognised as legitimate. Indeed, in so far as one of the ‘rules of 
the game’ (C,) is the creation of grand coalitions, this condition merely 
suggests that all must be aware of who the coalition members will be. 
Finally, fourth: 
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As it is applied in the extant literature, consociation typically constitutes 
an operating system of government. As such, it is a product of, and nested 
within, the constitutional order of the polity. Put differently, it evolves 
within a particular institutional context. However, there is nothing inherent 
in the logic of consociation to suggest that it cannot apply at a higher order 
as well, such as when the constitutional order itself stands to be constructed 
or sigdicantly reformed. Indeed, Belgium is an excellent case in point. 
Similarly, although it has been less successful, Canada has relied on 
consociation in the constitutional arena for much of its history. 
Reaching a consociational settlement in the constitutional arena is 
difficult, however, for at least two reasons. First, elite representatives of the 
salient societal pillars are required to adhere to the rules of the consocia- 
tional game, even as the rules for the political order as a whole are being re- 
written or constructed & novo. Second, because the stakes in the constitu- 
tional game are axiomatically high, societal groups may be less willing to 
grant elites exclusive control over the process (Manfredi and Lusztig 1998). 
Is this problematic? This article will argue that the short answer to this 
question depends upon the ability of elites collectively to maintain the four 
conditions discussed above. Perhaps the greatest danger to consociation in 
the constitutional arena is that unless elites are vigilant, consociation can be 
mimicked by a process far less amenable to stability in deeply divided 
societies. Indeed, where the inviolable rules of consociation are relaxed even 
slightly in the constitutional arena, attempts to construct a consociational 
settlement may fall victim to what Russell (1993a) refers to as ‘mega- 
constitutional’ politics. The mega-constitutional threshold is reached, 
according to Russell, when 
the constitutional question eclipses all other public issues and monopolies the 
attention of the body politic. This will occur where the following three conditions 
hold: (I )  the country attaches great importance to its written constitutional text; (2) 
the country has come to believe in a highly democratic constitutional process; (3) the 
country is deeply divided on constitutional matters. (Russell 1993a: 2; see also 
Russell 1994) 
At what point has this shift occurred? We suggest that mega-constitution- 
alism is likely to replace consociation in deeply cleaved societies in the 
presence of either or both of two violating conditions (V): 
VI: Mass input: that is, where the constitutional process has been opened up to non- 
elites, and where the constitutional process is driven or strongly influenced by 
nonelites, or elites not recognized as being part of the consociational process. 
Andor 
Vz: Mass legitimization: that is, where constitutional bargains are subject to formal 
Under such circumstances, the prospect for a lasting, stable constitutional 
settlement will be bleak. Moreover, as discussed below, other more 
or informal ratification through popular referenda. 
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pernicious consequences may result. Note that the point is not that 
referenda are destined necessarily to fail. Rather, it is that referenda have 
the potential to create future demands for more inclusive constitutional 
negotiating processes. In other words, referenda can become institutiona- 
lised, limiting the ability of elites to maintain consociational stability in the 
future. 
Since at least part of the present exercise is prescriptive, it is reasonable 
to address the issue of how elites can keep the process from tipping from 
the consociational to the mega-constitutional. Prescriptively, the central 
contention of the article is that mega-constitutionalism is most likely in the 
presence of what might be called ‘inclusive institutions’. Such institutions 
have the potential to open up the constitutional process to non-elites, thus 
not only violating the core conditions of consociationalism, but making the 
call for mass input and legitimisation that much more difficult for elites to 
resist. 
Inclusive institutions 
The consociational process is intricately bound to the institutional structure 
of the state. Indeed, institutions play a key role in determining which 
societal elements will be privileged, and by extension, which elites will be the 
‘players’ in the consociational game. In the quintessential consociational 
democracy - the Netherlands (at least prior to the breakdown of the 
religious pillars in the late 1960s) - the critical institution was the electoral 
system, which ensured that the governing elites proportionally reflected the 
most salient social divisions. Other consociational countries have relied on 
different institutional structures, such as federalism, to ensure that the 
groups considered to be the most politically salient at the time of 
institutional construction are adequately repre~ented.~ 
Most democracies, including consociational ones, have institutional 
structures that may be considered non-inclusive. That is, they provide for 
representation of a finite number of societal interests. In addition to the 
electoral systemS and institutions of federalism, such non-inclusive structures 
include institutions of mixed government based on the European estate 
system, and institutions associated with social corporatism. 
Some institutional structures, however, may be conceptualised as inclu- 
sive; that is, they provide for representation of an infinite number of actors.6 
Put differently, certain institutions provide constitutional status - or 
‘recognition in a hierarchy that lets those who hold it stake preferential 
claims on the resources of the state or on the political process itself’ (Brodie 
1996: 253). The quintessential example of an inclusive institution is the 
codified bill of rights. 
Bills of rights are inclusive in so far as they grant status in two ways. 
First, they typically enumerate certain categories of citizen as eligible for 
specific constitutional protection. Second, even where they scrupulously 
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avoid the enumeration of specific rights, they are axiomatically hostage to 
judicial interpretation that can create what in the American context are 
known as ‘suspect’ classifications - that is, conditions under which unnamed 
discrete and insular minorities can qualify for judicial recognition as status- 
holding min~rities.~ In this way, any number of groups can mobilise for 
status. 
Whether bestowed by inclusive or non-inclusive institutions, constitu- 
tional status provides the incentive for groups (and in some cases, 
governments) that hold it to preserve and seek to enhance such status. 
Moreover, where the opportunity arises to acquire status - during periods 
of constitutional renewal where inclusive institutions are in place - the 
incentive exists for groups to mobilise.* Thus, in deeply divided societies, 
such periods of constitutional renewal represent periods of threat to the 
consociational process. The threat is even greater if referenda are included 
in the process. As James Madison noted centuries ago (and, as indeed was 
borne out in Canada during the 1992 Charlottetown Accord referendum), 
periodic episodes of public input into the constitutional process engenders 
‘pernicious factions that might not otherwise come into existence’ (Madison 
1981: 22). 
Where inclusive institutions exist, the threat to consociationalism is great. 
New elites emerge to pursue their constituents’ claim for constitutional 
status. At the very least, these new elites make a credible demand to be 
represented at the constitutional bargaining table. This creates debate and 
ambiguity as to who the relevant constitutional actors are (potentially 
violating C4). Finally, because new elites may find the bargaining process 
difficult to break into, they may seek to enhance their legitimacy by 
appealing for popular referenda. Where they are successful, the process can 
be said to have entered the realm of mega-constitutional politics. The 
stability of the consociational process, in other words, will have been 
sacrificed for the passion and disruption of the mega-constitutional. 
The Canadian context 
Canada provides an excellent illustration of the consequences associated 
with the breakdown of the consociational process, and the emergence of 
mega-constitutionalism. The Canadian constitutional landscape is littered 
with failed attempts to create a constitutional identity acceptable to all 
regions of the country - especially the overwhelmingly francophone 
province of Quebec. Through the Fulton-Favreau Accord of 1964, the 1971 
Victoria Charter, the partially successful 1981 Patriation Accord, the 1987 
Meech Lake Accord and finally the recent Charlottetown Accord (1992), 
Canada has attempted to reform its constitution to include an indigenous 
amending formula and a means of coming to terms with its traditionally 
recognised cultural d~a l i ty .~  
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Over the past thirty years this perpetual bout of constitutional introspec- 
tion has led to the creation of three distinct constitutional pillars, each of 
which has been accommodated within a consociational arrangement. These 
pillars, respectively, are associated with Canadian nationalism, Quebec 
sovereignty and Western alienation.’O However, a fourth such pillar, that 
has emerged since the early 1990s, has brought Canada into the realm of 
mega-constitutional politics. 
This fourth, ‘minoritarian’, pillar has not been accommodated success- 
fully within the consociational process. Indeed, it is less an orientation than 
an aggregation of interests that have fared poorly under the majoritarian 
parliamentary system, and instead have taken advantage of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to carve out a constitutional niche for themselves 
(Cairns 1990). The Charter has created a sense of appropriation on the part 
of citizens over the constitution. Not only has it given citizens a greater 
stake in the constitution, and by extension the constitutional process, but it 
has granted even larger stakes to groups that have been given specific 
interests and rights - or constitutional status. Women, aboriginals and what 
Cairns calls ‘third-force Canadians’ (those of non-English or French 
backgrounds) all have been granted status by virtue of provisions such as 
sections 25, 27 and 28. In addition, judicial interpretation of the equality 
provision (section 15) ensures that any group can claim charter protection if 
it manifestly constitutes a ‘distinct and insular minority’. As a result, groups 
representing disabled Canadians, immigrants and visible minorities, all have 
sought to have their concerns addressed constitutionally (Lusztig 1994). 
In sum, the new constitutional pluralism that has accompanied the post- 
Charter era in Canada has created a new dimension in a constitutional 
dialogue that previously was concerned solely with the intergovernmental 
division of powers. The notion of group status and citizen propriety over 
the constitution has meant that the traditional consociational process of 
constitutional bargaining has been increasingly seen as illegitimate. The 
perception is that ‘11 white men in a locked room’ cannot represent the 
constitutional interests of the ever-expanding list of constitutional clients. 
As a result, significant procedural changes characterised constitutional 
politics in the aftermath of the failed Meech Lake Accord. 
The Meech Lake Accord, signed in April 1987, witnessed the start of the 
demise (at least for the foreseeable future) of consociational constitutional 
bargaining in Canada. The Accord was a surprise announcement, negotiated 
behind closed doors, with no public input sought or received. However, 
over the course of the three-year ratification period, in which each provincial 
legislature, as well as the national parliament, had to approve the 
agreement, the Accord was attacked for failure to reflect adequately the new 
social cleavages that characterised the Canadian constitutional dialogue. 
Indeed, the Meech Lake Accord, both procedurally and substantively, 
ignored the fact that certain groups, largely women, aboriginals and 
linguistic minorities, had been successful in utilising the Charter of Rights 
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and Freedoms as an entrie into the constitutional arena (Simeon 1990; 
Cairns 1995; Stein 1995). 
The perception, following the failure of Meech Lake, that the Constitu- 
tion could no longer be the exclusive preserve of governments, stimulated 
the government of Brian Mulroney to open the constitutional process to 
increased popular participation. To this end a number of federal commis- 
sions and parliamentary committees of investigation were set up to canvass 
the views of ‘ordinary’ Canadians with respect to the Constitution. In 
consequence, it was argued, elites would be in a position to reflect better the 
aspirations of the constituents they represented. In order to ensure this, it 
was ultimately determined that the constitutional settlement reached would 
be subject to (unofficial) popular ratification through a referendum. 
Another innovation stimulated by the failure of the Meech Lake Accord 
was the opening of the constitutional bargaining process. Heretofore the 
exclusive preserve of the eleven first ministers, what became known as the 
Charlottetown negotiations expanded to include the leaders of the North- 
west Territories and the Yukon, as well as representatives of four aboriginal 
groups.“ 
The procedural changes in the Charlottetown Round proved too great a 
strain for the consociational process to bear. Indeed, the process violated 
almost all the stipulated conditions for consociationalism. The first critical 
problem came early in the process. To many groups, the composition of the 
players at the constitutional negotiating table seemed arbitrary and unjust. 
In August 1992, even before the seventeen bargaining elites agreed to the 
Charlottetown Accord, the Native Women’s Association of Canada 
(NWAC) obtained a (short-lived) injunction in the Federal Court of 
Canada to halt the negotiations because none of the four aboriginal groups 
at the table represented WAC’S interests. Thus, even before the Accord 
was reached, C1 had been violated. 
Other problems quickly followed. Groups that had been excluded from 
the constitutional bargaining process reacted bitterly to their exclusion. The 
most prominent women’s organisation in the country, the National Action 
Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), came out against the Accord, 
in part because women had not been represented at the negotiating table. 
Women (as well as other groups representing linguistic minorities, immi- 
grant and visible minorities, and the handicapped) were disillusioned that 
although, like natives, the source of their legal constitutional status derived 
from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they were not accorded the same 
pride of place at the Charlottetown negotiations. Moreover, since roughly 
one-third of the massive (60 amendment) Charlottetown Accord was 
devoted to aboriginal issues, the cost of exclusion seemed tangible and very 
high. The apparently arbitrary decision to reward certain recent status 
holders with a seat at the constitutional bargaining table, while excluding 
others, challenged, if not violated C4. 
Ironically, the most vulnerable condition, C3, was on its face not violated. 
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Despite the passions that raged during the Charlottetown debate, the 
seventeen constitutional elites were able to reach an accord. On the other 
hand, the high k-score involved in the process led to other problems. 
Specifically, it meant that elites were not able to ensure the compliance of 
their constituent populations to the Accord. Because of the requirement of 
mass legitimisation through referendum, this proved fatal to the success of 
the enterprise. The amount of compromise necessary to forge agreement 
among elites representing such a vast array of constitutional world views 
made the Charlottetown unpalatable to the majority of Canadians.'* 
Indeed, the emergence of rival elites (that is, those not present at the 
constitutional bargaining table), representing all of the constitutional pillars, 
as opinion leaders during the Charlottetown referendum debate, once again 
constituted a serious challenge to C1 in the Charlottetown Round.I3 
The failure of Charlottetown is illustrative of how destabilising the shift 
from consociationalism to mega-constitutionalism can be. Within the 
aboriginal community, renewed talks on aboriginal self-government have 
been fruitless, and Indian bands in British Columbia, Ontario and New 
Brunswick have indicated their frustration with armed road blocks and 
occupation of crown land. Even more perniciously, in the 1993 federal 
election Quebeckers voted overwhelmingly for the separatist Bloc Quebecois. 
Provincially, a hard-line separatist Parti Quebecois government was elected 
the following year. On 30 October 1995, Quebec held a referendum on 
independence. The surprisingly close vote, 49.44 per cent for the Yes, 50.56 
per cent for the No, pitched Canada yet again into constitutional crisis. The 
prospect of yet another referendum on Quebec separation looms on the not- 
too-distant horizon. Moreover, the damage to the Canadian economy has 
been severe. A lack of investor confidence in Canada's constitutional 
stability has kept the Canadian dollar weak through most of the decade, 
and has retarded the growth of an economy already hampered by high tax 
rates and a large public debt. Such consequences, in turn, have served to 
reinforce numerous groups' dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
On the other hand, destabilising as the crisis has been, disaffected groups 
rarely have resorted to violence in Canada. Yet such a peaceful outcome 
can scarcely be expected where the breakdown of the consociational process 
occurs in deeply divided societies with a history of violent conflict. The 
discussion now turns to an analysis of one such society - Northern Ireland. 
The Northern Ireland context 
What lessons can Northern Ireland learn from Canada's futile experience 
with constitutional reform? While the current peace process, following the 
second IRA cease-fire, offers an opportunity for constitutional renewal, 
judged against the Canadian experience, the reform programme based on 
the 1995 Frameworks Do~ument, '~ the Mitchell Report,15 and the Good 
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Friday Agreement can be characterised as mega-constitutional and therefore 
unlikely to promote the conditions necessary for long-term political stability. 
The contention of this article is that elites attempting to construct an 
enduring Northern Irish constitutional settlement would be better served by 
adhering more faithfully to the consociational process that has been utilised, 
albeit thus far unsuccessfully, from as early as 1969, the beginning of what 
has been euphemistically described as ‘the troub1es’.l6 Obviously this is a 
very tall order. Northern Ireland’s history provides its elites with little 
policy manoeuvrability. However, it is our contention that this only 
underscores the need to adhere closely to the consociational model. 
Otherwise, we predict, the seeds of instability will be sown into the 
constitutional structure from the beginning. 
The main pillars of Northern Ireland’s proto-consociational experiments 
have been the five major political parties - the UUP, Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the Alliance 
Party (APNI) and, most recently, Sinn Fkin (SF). In addition, at least until 
the Good Friday Agreement was reached, the consociational process also 
included the governments of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. As 
in Canada, each of the pillars features rival elites with an incentive to 
mobilise the politically dissatisfied. The Reverend Ian Paisley of the DUP is 
the most prominent, although by no means isolated, example of this 
phenomenon in Northern Ireland. 
An important antecedent to the outbreak of violence in 1969 was an 
attempt by then Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O”eil1 to 
address Catholic accusations of widespread discrimination in housing and 
employment juxtaposed with gerrymandering of electoral boundaries 
(Whyte 1983, 1990). Such efforts to secure elite accommodation with 
Catholic representatives and members of the Republic of Ireland govern- 
ment were viewed as too conciliatory and led ultimately to his resignation in 
1969 thrqugh a loss in support from the Unionist rank-and-file and his 
parliamentary party. As the violence increased, the Northern Ireland 
Parliament (Stormont) was prorogued in 1972 and powers transferred to a 
new British Cabinet minister, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. 
This arrangement was referred to as direct rule from Westminster (Bew 
et al. 1979; Arthur 1987). 
The first attempt to secure constitutional reform, following the introduc- 
tion of direct rule, came in 1973 when a Northern Ireland Assembly was 
elected by proportional representation and a Power Sharing Executive 
formed from its members. Bargaining between elites comprising representa- 
tives of the British government, the taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland and 
members of the new Executive secured the so-called Sunningdale Agree- 
ment, which protected the rights of the Catholic minority by endorsing 
Catholics’ desire to share power, and created a Council of Ireland, with 
members drawn from the North and South, to deal with matters of 
common concern. Unionist Party leader Brian Faulkner, however, could not 
554 Michael Lusztig and Colin Knox 
secure the support of his party or voters for the agreement. Opposition 
crystallised in the form of a general strike by the Protestant Ulster Workers’ 
Council, that crippled the province through the control of food and 
electricity supplies. Grassroots Protestants made it clear through their 
actions that they would accept no dealings with the Republic in a Council 
of Ireland nor would they share power with Catholic politicians. The Power 
Sharing Executive collapsed in 1974 (Bew and Patterson 1985). 
It was not until 1982 that the Northern Ireland secretary of State 
proposed ‘rolling devolution’ under which an elected Northern Ireland 
Assembly would gradually assume executive powers in proportion to 
politicians’ willingness to share responsibility (O’Leary et al. 1988). Both 
sides had to agree on how such powers should be discharged, with the 
endorsement of not less than 70 per cent of the Assembly members. 
Although all parties fought the elections to the Assembly, the Nationalists 
(SDLP and Sinn Fein) boycotted it in protest against any initiative that 
sought internal solutions (excluding Dublin) to Northern Ireland’s problems 
and Unionists’ willingness to work exclusively on quasi-majoritarian terms. 
With no acceptable proposals for devolved structures emerging from the 
Assembly and electoral support for Sinn Fein increasing at the expense of 
the SDLP, the British and Irish governments signed the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in 1985 (Aughey 1989; Connolly and Loughlin 1986). 
The Agreement asserted that the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland would not change without the consent of a majority of its 
inhabitants and established an Intergovernmental Conference between 
Britain and the Republic of Ireland as a forum within which the Irish 
Republic could forward views on a range of political, security and legal 
matters, reflective of the nationalist perspective in the North. Unionists were 
incensed that the Agreement had been negotiated without consulting the 
unionist majority, incorporated an Irish dimension and had the status of 
international law. The two main unionist parties, the UUP and DUP, 
engaged in a campaign of political disruption and demonstrations that 
failed to rescind the Agreement, and their relationship with government 
ministers plummeted to an all-time low until inter-party discussions resumed 
in 1991 (Knox and Connolly 1988). These were aimed at securing a 
consensus on a power sharing local assembly with new North-South and 
Anglo-Irish intergovernmental institutions. The talks got bogged down over 
procedural and substantive wrangling and eventually foundered. 
With the breakdown in the inter-party talks, both the British and Irish 
governments seized the initiative and issued the Anglo-Irish Joint (Downing 
Street) Declaration in December 1993.17 The Joint Declaration stated that 
ultimate decisions on governing Northern Ireland would be made by a 
majority of the citizens therein, the Republic of Ireland would, as part of an 
overall settlement, seek to revise its constitutional claim to sovereignty over 
the six counties of Northern Ireland, and Britain would not block the 
possible reunification of Ireland, if it were backed by a majority in the 
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North. The Joint Declaration, set alongside a flurry of secret discussions 
that included an unpublished peace plan devised by the SDLP and Sinn 
Fkin, acted as a catalyst for the IRA cease-fire and prompted the 
Frameworks Document published in February 1995. 
Northern Irelrmd: the peace process? 
The publication of the Frameworks Document represented a promising 
attempt to bring stability to Northern Ireland through nascent consocia- 
tional arrangements.18 Within the Frameworks Document it was apparent 
that both governments attempted to secure consociational cooperation in 
which the expected benefits of such cooperation were greater than societal 
costs (k). Given the bloody nature of the status quo, this condition was 
fairly easy to satisfy. The Irish government committed itself to introducing 
and supporting proposals to amend articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution 
whereby ‘no territorial claim of right to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland, 
contrary to the will of a majority of its people is asserted’ (Northern 
Ireland, 22 February 1995: 355-70). By the same token the British 
government reaffirmed that it would uphold the democratic wish of a 
greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether 
they prefer to support the Union, or a sovereign United Ireland. The British 
government was equally cognisant of either option and open to its 
democratic realisation. In particular, it pledged not to impede movement 
towards a United Ireland. These changes have been formally included in the 
Good Friday Agreement, whereby the British and Irish governments agreed 
to resolve their historical differences through the ‘general and mutual 
acceptance of the principle of consent’. 
The bargain was endorsed by proposals for non-inclusive, elite- 
dominated institutions in the form of a new North-South body charged 
with a range of consultative, harmonising and executive functions. 
Membership of the new body would be drawn from, and accountable to, 
the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish parliament. 
Decisions in the body could only be taken where there was agreement 
between North and South. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish 
parliament would therefore have an absolute safeguard against proposals 
of which it did not approve. 
The Frameworks Document and subsequent Good Friday Agreement 
provide prima facie evidence, therefore, of budding consociational coopera- 
tion. They were the product of bargaining among elites, specifically British, 
Irish and Northern Irish politicians. The benefits of cooperation or keeping 
societal costs low, were also apparent. The revision of the Republic’s 
constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, as a placatory measure for 
unionists, was reciprocated with the British position not to block reunifica- 
tion, a measure designed to appease Nationalists. 
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On the other hand, the promise of long-term political stability may well 
be undermined by certain anomalies that have the potential to violate the 
principles of consociationalism. Specifically, these anomalies include: the 
entrenchment of provisions for mass legitimisation (referenda) on the Good 
Friday Agreement reached between elites and the resulting instability caused 
by issues highlighted in the referenda campaign; a proposed bill of rights for 
Northern Ireland; and considerable ambiguity over who exactly the key 
players are in the game. We consider each in turn. 
The Frameworks Document set out the parameters for the multiparty 
talks process and eventual agreement. The talks were described in the 
Frameworks Document as ‘the most comprehensive attainable negotiations 
with democratically mandated political parties in Northern Ireland which 
abide exclusively by peaceful means and wish to join in dialogue on the way 
ahead’ (The Times, 22 February 1995:5). Thereafter, a ‘triple lock safeguard’ 
against any proposals being imposed on Northern Ireland operated. First, 
proposals had to command the support of the political parties in Northern 
Ireland; second, proposals had to be approved by the people of Northern 
Ireland (and the Republic) in referenda; and third, the necessary legislation 
had to be passed by the United Kingdom parliament. This explicit shift 
away from the principles of consociation does not bode well for a long-term 
stable constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the requirement 
of mass legitimisation, as the Canadian example suggests, raised popular 
interest in the constitutional negotiating process, and threatens to under- 
mine one of the core conditions of consociationalism (C3). 
The so-called ‘peace referenda’ (in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic) exposed several issues formally agreed between the political elites 
which have in the short term the potential to wreck the Good Friday 
Agreement and in the long term to undermine political stability. Those 
campaigning against the Agreement (rival elites in the DUP, UK unionists 
and dissident Ulster unionists) highlighted the early release of ‘political’ 
prisoners without prior decommissioning of terrorist weapons and the entry 
of Sinn Ftin into the Executive of the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The 
public parading of IRA and loyalist prisoners (the Balcombe Street gang 
and Michael Stone respectively) in a triumphalist display prior to the 
referenda was seized upon by the ‘No’ campaigners as proof of what the 
Agreement meant in practice and how the victims of violence had been 
forgotten. The prime minister, Tony Blair, intervened to assuage doubters 
that subsequent legislation would establish ‘objective and verifiable tests’ as 
to whether those involved had given up violence before they could take their 
places in the Northern Ireland Assembly Executive or take advantage of 
accelerated prisoner release. 
The Agreement makes a strong commitment to rights, safeguards and 
equality of opportunity (Strand 3: 15- 16). The British government will 
complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Conven- 
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and 
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remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to 
overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency. Additional rights 
will be established beyond the ECHR to reflect the principles of mutual 
respect for identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem. 
Taken together these will constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
While, on the face of it, such an institutionalised commitment to basic 
rights appears both laudable and innocuous, the Canadian experience 
suggests otherwise. Depending on the scope of judicial interpretation of 
such a bill of rights, new elites with only marginal commitment to political 
stability may find a powerful voice within the policy and constitutional 
process. Indeed, there are already a number of groups with vested interests 
in the peace process that could exploit such institutional niches to their 
own, but not necessarily general, advantages. The emergence of fringe 
loyalist parties (the Progressive Unionist Party, PUP and the Ulster 
Democratic Party, UDP)19 now representing Protestant paramilitaries and 
in direct discussions with British and Irish government ministers, is the most 
obvious example of a ‘new’ political elite with a very limited electoral 
mandate holding centre stage in the evolving constitutional debate. The 
same is true of Sinn Fein (political wing of the IRA, with a more significant 
16 per cent of the vote), much to the annoyance of mainstream constitu- 
tional unionist parties who accuse the British government of operating to 
their agenda. This new-found role for marginalised groups is promoted 
through a dual process involving a loss of confidence in ‘traditional’ political 
representatives alongside an increasing reliance on community politics. 
Similarly, the role played by senior Catholic and Protestant church leaders 
either explicitly or, more likely, implicitly, in brokering the cease-fires 
through direct contact with paramilitaries, or acting in the capacity of 
emissary or intermediary has raised their profile and ascribed to them a 
degree of unheralded political clout.20 Some further examples include 
prisoners’ rights groups working for the release of ‘political prisoners’, 
victims’ support groups pressing for no leniency to be shown to terrorists, 
and community groups mobilising to capture a slice of the E240 million 
European Union Peace and Reconciliation Programme.*’ It is easy to see 
how the political power of these, and other, group leaders could be further 
enhanced through the creation of a bill of rights. A further example of an 
‘inclusive institution’ is the proposed consultative Civic Forum to be 
established under the terms of the Agreement (Strand 1). It will comprise 
representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors and act as 
a consultative mechanism to the Assembly on social, economic and cultural 
issues. 
There is therefore no longer universal recognition of those who constitute 
the key players in the bargaining process and a deep suspicion about the 
legitimacy of the fringe Loyalist and Republican politicians in future 
operation of the Assembly. In sum, the Agreement provides for mass input 
and the potential for inclusive institutions; both present a threat, as was 
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seen in Canada, to promoting constitutional stability by creating the 
potential to militate against a low k-score (C3), and by creating ambiguity 
as to the rules of the game (C2). Even more perniciously, perhaps, the 
adoption of a constitutional bill of rights may cast doubts upon those who 
constitute players in the consociational game (C4). 
Conclusion 
Do proposals for reform contained in the Northern Ireland Agreement 
therefore represent a failure to establish the principles of consociation and a 
drift towards mega-constitutionalism oblivious of the lessons provided by 
the Meech and Charlottetown Accords? One clear difference is, of course, 
that consociation has never taken root in Northern Ireland, a fact that 
biases the process toward mega-constitutionalism. As a consequence, a 
history of terrorism creates the necessity of incorporating supporters of 
violence into the constitutional process. In a bid to convince the gunmen 
that thirty bloody years have not been in vain, fringe Loyalist and 
Republican parties were given entrke to the constitutional arena. To secure 
further their input at multiparty talks, and hence achieve endorsement by 
paramilitaries, the British government devised a complex electoral system 
for the new peace forum designed to ensure fringe party representation. 
When the political parties failed to reach a consensus on the preferred 
election format during proximity talks, the government imposed a constitu- 
ency-based proportional representation (and an eccentric, unique province- 
wide list) voting system. The ability of the main constitutional parties (the 
bargaining elites) to secure a long-term agreement within Northern Ireland 
was, however, called into question by a requirement that the outcome must 
be endorsed through a referendum. This simply provided an opportunity for 
the anti-agreement lobby to whip up emotions over controversial issues. 
Both these moves (incorporating paramilitaries and mass legitimisation), 
although understandable given the yearning for peace and the frustrations 
of the political impasse respectively, create destabilising circumstances in 
which mega-constitutional conditions predominate. In other words, our 
point is not that the new process has the potential to make a stable polity 
unstable. The status quo in Northern Ireland was obviously unstable. 
Instead, while recognising the remarkable achievement in Northern Ireland, 
we question the extent to which the optimal institutional structure was 
constructed and can endure given insensitivity to the importance of elite 
accommodation and the incorporation of civic society and paramilitary 
representatives as a forum of mass appeal. What lessons, if any, can be 
learned from Canada? 
One thing is patently obvious, mass legitimisation through referenda is 
divisive, as the 1992 Charlottetown referendum illustrates. Wresting respon- 
sibility from elites to achieve accommodation through mass input alongside 
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the proliferation of marginal interest groups risks disastrous destabilisation. 
Indeed, one of the pernicious effects of referenda is that they have a long- 
term destabilising effect. In other words, they are the breeding ground for 
future constitutional demands - either by groups that had been previously 
excluded from the process, or by more radical elements of existing groups. 
The danger exists that the euphoria surrounding the Good Friday 
Agreement and the peace referendum will quickly evaporate and old hatred 
reemerge, compounded by the controversies highlighted during efforts to 
secure mass legitimisation. Major splits already have developed within the 
ranks of the Ulster Unionist Party with several MPs publicly opposing their 
leader’s (David Trimble) stance on the Agreement. Conflicting statistics 
emerged about the extent to which Protestants supported the Agreement in 
the referendum-exit polls suggested 55 per cent, whilst ‘No’ campaigners 
claimed 56 per cent of unionists opposed the deal. The campaign for the 
election to the 108 member Assembly will place inevitable strains on the 
‘Yes’ alliance as parties compete for seats. The Democratic Unionist Party 
claimed they will make it unworkable and dissident Ulster unionists may 
well seek election with a view to disrupting its operation on those 
controversial issues which surfaced during the referendum. The spectre of 
two Sinn Fbin ministers with executive authority operating within a cross- 
community decision making process (either parallel consent or a weighted 
majority) and the operation of a North-South Ministerial Council working 
on an all-Ireland basis in specified areas (e.g. tourism, agriculture, water- 
ways) has the potential for major instability in the Unionist ranks (moderate 
and hard-line). Similarly, an insistence on decommissioning and an over- 
zealous application of the ‘objective and verifiable’ tests on violence for 
early release prisoners could cause problems for the extremists (loyalist and 
republican). 
While it is important to note that the mass commitment to peace in 
Northern Ireland, after thirty years of violence, is likely to be greater than 
popular commitment to constitutional reconciliation in Canada, the 
consequences of failure also are far greater. The prospect of ‘capture’ of the 
constitutional process by groups not committed to peace and stability is 
greatly enhanced if such groups are given a legitimate entrie into the 
process through mass legitimisation and inclusive institutions. Indeed, 
Canada’s experience of constitutional reform has shown that such instru- 
ments of constitutional democracy are by no means as benign as they 
appear. Canada should have provided valuable lessons, instead Northern 
Ireland appears to be on the verge of replicating mistakes made. 
Notes 
1 The main elements of the Agreement are: 
Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will stay that way for as long as that is 
the wish of a majority of the people who live there. If the people of Northern Ireland were 
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formally to consent to the establishment of a United Ireland, the government of the day  would 
bring forward proposals, in consultation with the Irish government, to give effect to that wish. 
The Irish government will amend the Irish Constitution to bring it into line with this 
understanding, and the necessary changes will be made to British constitutional legislation. 
There will be greater democratic accountability in Northern Ireland through the devolution 
of a wide range of executive and legislative powers to a Northern Ireland Assembly. Posts of 
executive authority will be shared on a proportional basis and safeguards will be in place to 
protect the interests of both main parts of the community. 
There will be a North-South Ministerial Council bringing together those with executive 
authority, North and South, to work together by agreement on matters of mutual interest. 
Those participating on the Council will be mandated by and remain accountable to the 
Assembly and the Irish parliament. There will be a British-Irish Council to bring together the 
two governments and representatives of devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales, and from the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. 
There will be a new British-Irish Agreement to replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 
November 1985. This sets out the new shared understanding on constitutional matters. It also 
creates a new British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference which will deal with all bilateral 
issues between the two governments. 
The Agreement also includes a range of measures to enhance the proper protection of basic 
human rights including a new independent Human Rights Commission in Northern Ireland to 
consult and advise on the scope for defining rights supplementary to those in the European 
Convention on Human Rights which the government are already in the process of 
incorporating into UK law. 
2 Consociationalism is a term and concept developed by Lijphart. See Lijphart (1968, 1977); 
for more on the theory see Noel (1971), McRae (1974), Barry (1989), Tsebelis (1990), McGarry 
and OLeary (1995). 
3 Deeply divided societies are operationalised as those in which the dominant lines of social 
cleavage are ‘pre-modern’ - that is, based on language, ethnicity or religion. Note that political 
stability in non-liberal democratic societies can be achieved through less nuanced means than 
consociation. See for example the control model used in authoritarian societies (Lustick 1979). 
4 Thus, to take one example, Canada has ensured that the various provinces are represented 
in non- majoritarian institutions such as the Senate, and to a greater degree in recent decades, 
institutionalised summit meetings between the prime minister and provincial premiers, known 
as First Ministers’ Conferences. 
5 Even proportional representation (PR) systems are non-inclusive in so far as they provide 
for representation of only a finite number of groups. Even fewer of these groups will be in a 
position to demand credibly an important role in the governance of the polity. 
6 For more on inclusive institutions see Manfredi and Lusztig (1998). 
7 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144 (1938). 
8 Note that the argument here is not deterministic. The coincidence of inclusive institutions 
and periods of constitutional renewal do not axiomatically lead to the breakdown of 
consociation. 
9 For a good history of the Canadian constitutional process see Stein (1984) and Russell 
(1993b). 
10 For a comprehensive discussion of these see Lusztig (1994). 
1 1 These groups respectively represented Status (reserve dwelling) Indians, Non-Status Indians, 
Inuit and Mttis (those of mixed aboriginal and French blood). 
12 Provincially the referendum passed only in Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island and Ontario (by 49.8 per cent to 49.6 per cent); it failed in the remaining six provinces, 
as well as in the Yukon Territory. In addition, the best estimates indicate that aboriginals voted 
strongly against the Accord (Turpel 1993). 
13 For more on the role of rival elites in influencing public support see Lusztig (1994) and 
Canada West Foundation (1993). 
14 ‘Frameworks for the Future’ was published on 22 February 1995. It comprised two 
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documents: ‘A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland’ and ‘A New 
Framework for Agreement’, formerly referred to as the ‘Joint Framework Document’. The first 
deals with Strand 1 talks, or agreement between parties within Northern Ireland. The second 
describes proposals for developing a NorthSouth relationship (Strand 2) and an Anglo-Irish 
(Britain and the Republic of Ireland) agreement (Strand 3). For more on the Frameworks 
Document, and on its nominally consociational elements, see Lijphart (1996). 
I5 On 28 November 1995 the British and Irish governments launched the Twin Track 
Initiative, the aim of which was to create the confidence necessary for substantive all-party 
negotiations to begin by the end of February 1996. It established, on the one hand, an 
international body (chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell) to examine the 
decommissioning of illegal arms, and on the other, a parallel phase of preparatory talks 
designed to examine the basis of participation, format and agenda for all-party negotiations. 
16 The application of consociational principles or power sharing to Northern Ireland has both 
advocates and critics. In the former category, O’Leary (1989) suggests that the most favourable 
conditions for power sharing (a multiple balance of power; a commonly perceived external 
threat or the removal of the rival threats; overarching society-wide loyalties and socioeconomic 
equality between the communities) are largely absent in Northern Ireland. McGarry and 
O’Leary (1995) point out that the various attempts to promote consociation have failed and the 
same fate is likely to result in the constitutional negotiations which follow the Framework 
Document. Chief amongst the critics of consociationalism is Barry (1991) who is concerned that 
applying such principles could, in fact, make things worse. He argues that there is no easy 
alternative to accommodation between the two communities but suggests that Britain’s stance 
on insisting on a power sharing constitution in any final settlement, as a guarantee that the 
Catholic minority will be accommodated, makes a resolution less rather than more likely. 
17 The Joint Declaration was agreed between the then Republic of Ireland taoiseach, Albert 
Reynolds and the British prime minister, John Major. It set out an agreed framework devised 
by both governments and committed them to promote cooperation at all levels on the basis of 
fundamental principles, undertakings, obligations under international agreements and guaran- 
tees that each government had given and reaffirmed, including Northern Ireland’s statutory 
constitutional guarantee. It was described as the starting point of a peace process designed to 
culminate in a political settlement. 
18 The Framework Document proposed a number of initiatives including provisions for: 
a 90 member Assembly for Northern Ireland elected by proportional representation, with 
substantial legislative and administrative powers; 
a North-South body comprising elected representatives of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and the Irish parliament; 
an end to the Republic’s constitutional claim over Northern Ireland; 
increased London and Dublin cooperation through a standing intergovernmental conference, 
but with no right to interfere with the Northern Ireland Assembly; 
separate referenda in the North and South with a majority needed in each case for proposals 
to proceed. 
The document was presented not as an immutable blueprint, but as a contribution to the talks 
process, either bilaterals or round-table negotiations involving all political parties. OLeary 
(1995) describes the two framework documents as ‘the most far-reaching and intelligent tests 
yet produced by the two governments, and one must be hopeful that they will lead to fruitful 
negotiations’. He highlights three problems, however. The documents are: (a) vagudinconsistent 
in their commitments on rights, law and the judiciary; (b) devoid of methods for reaching the 
proposed agreement, apart from the ultimate prospect of referenda and constitutional 
legislation in the two sovereign parliaments; (c) short on suggestions about what happens if 
there are no negotiations, or no negotiations which produce an agreement which can be sold in 
two referenda. 
19 The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) is the successor of the Independent Unionist Group 
formed in 1974. It is generally accepted to be the voice of the paramilitary group, the Ulster 
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Volunteer Force (WF). The Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), formerly the Ulster Loyalist 
Democratic Party (ULDP), was formed in 1981 and is Seen to give political expression to the 
paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The Combined Loyalist Military 
Command is a united front representing the UVF and UDA (Bruce 1992, 1994). 
20 For a more detailed discussion on the role played by the churches in the Northern Ireland 
conflict see Radford (1993); Morrow et al. (1994). 
21 The European Commission approved a special support programme for peace and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland in July 1995. The 
programme has two strategic objectives: (i) to promote the social inclusion of those who are at 
the margins of social and economic life; (ii) to exploit the opportunities and address the needs 
arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and advance social and 
economic regeneration. 
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